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“Cheeki Rafiki” Loss Update

Many of you will remember that I wrote an in-depth opinion piece on the tragic loss of four lives due to the sinking of Cheeki Rafiki and what I see as the total failure of the enquiry report to highlight the real lesson: existing yacht construction rules, particularly as they relate to the keel to hull joint, are nowhere near stringent enough.

Sadly, it seems that nothing is being done about that, though there are other developments, as the director of the sail training firm that managed the boat is being held criminally responsible.

I suppose this is a good development in that it may encourage others to be more careful.

On the other hand, I still feel that the industry and regulators have missed the most important point: if the boat had been properly built no one would have died regardless of what short cuts the management company may, or may not, have taken.

And since the boat was built to applicable standards for offshore work*, surely improving those standards is where we should be looking.

Thanks to Colin Speedie for bringing this to my attention.

*I quote from the report:

ISO 12215-9 defines Design Category A as: ‘category of craft considered suitable to operate in seas with significant wave heights above 4m and wind speeds in excess of Beaufort Force 8, but excluding abnormal conditions such as hurricanes.

With reference to the hindcast weather data for 0300 on 16 May 2014, it is concluded that Cheeki Rafiki was operating within its design category criteria at the time of its loss.

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Comments

This is a complex issue, please read my original in-depth opinion before commenting.

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Dick Stevenson

Hi John,
To some large degree, I feel that having categories that give different levels of scantlings for “offshore” vs “coastal” cruising propagates a myth that is dangerous. A keel falling off near-shore might be less likely to end up in death than offshore, but likely only marginally so. Keels (offshore or coastal designs) should be able to hit a rock at the boat’s cruising speed without integrity compromising damage (and surveyors/repair people need to be more accomplished at diagnosis/repair). Although I will relinquish the point that boats and crew are often beat up worse offshore, I am clear that some of the Alchemy’s (and her crew) most challenging times have been near shore coastal cruising. The myth, to my mind, is that when you go out in a boat locally, that somehow your boat does not need to be as well designed/made nor does the skipper need to be as experienced. In general, this has clear validity, but obscures the fact that when out in a boat, events can take a difficult and deadly turn in ways that most of our activities do not dish out. Being out in a boat has some relatively unique aspects. Mother nature just has a lot more influence on a boater and there are just not always easy and safe alternatives (like pulling over to the side of the road if out driving). In this, I believe that the airplane analogy in your prior essay is relevant: long flight or short, high altitude or low, you do not want any compromises in structural integrity.
Just some random thoughts, not sure where they go.
My best, Dick Stevenson, s/v Alchemy

Marc Dacey

Good point, Dick. In-shore, one can find both harsher conditions and a 50% reduction of options (or worse, in a bay) than is the case offshore. I’ve seen cases of production boats (but not those built prior to circa 1980, interestingly) in which the tabbing on bulkheads has failed or the hulls have oilcanned in harsh conditions, which should not be the case anywhere, never mind Lake Ontario. I find the aircraft analogy apt and the glossing over of the physics versus dollars argument is a serious shortcoming of an otherwise incisive report.

If this is what “built to code” is, then we have issues with the code.

Rob Gill

Hi John,
I am interested in what merchant shipping law is deemed to have been broken, when the yacht apparently compiled with Cat 1 and the build standards as required. It will be interesting to find out though as I can’t help feeling this may be a beat-up – the regulators can’t be wrong surely!
However, as I read it Cheeki Rafiki had a mixed usage profile with periods of bare-boat charters and offshore skippered charters. Due to this mixed use, “failure of keel or rudder due to previous unreported grounding” should have been noted as having HIGH risk and HIGH impact in the organisation and vessel’s risk register. I do wonder if Storm Force Coaching had this covered with appropriate strategies for mitigation or minimisation?
Based on 15 years of chartering both in NZ and whilst working overseas (including the UK), I wouldn’t take any vessel that had been in bare-boat charter across the Atlantic, no matter how well equipped. We experienced a litany of failures in charter yacht portholes, rigs, sails, anchors and other equipment failures too numerous to list. The simple fact is that most charterers do not report major incidents for fear of losing their deposit. Scarier still, even if charterers do report a major incident, then this is often treated as “business as usual” for a charter boat. We came out of the Lefkas canal (Greece) under instruction to follow our flotilla leader in line astern and to our (and his) surprise, hitting a rock and coming to a dead stop from six knots – the boat was never even dive inspected. The leader’s comment – “happens all the time Rob, don’t worry about it”.

For a business like Storm Force Coaching, the only effective risk minimisation strategy I can think of would be to remove charterer deposits and mandate full incident reporting encouraged by compulsory replacement insurance cover with no excess fees. The insurance monies then being rigorously applied to inspection and repair. The only risk mitigation strategy I can think of is no mixed use (bare-boat charter / offshore charter) for any vessel – no matter how much the keel-to-hull build regulations are improved in the future.
Kind regards,
Rob

Alastair Currie

The UK Merchant Shipping Act is the law that is being referred to by Criminal Prosecution Service. The yacht is defined as a small ship and there is a responsibility placed on owners and / or agents to send a ship to see that is fit for purpose. If there is evidence that the yacht was not fit for purpose, or that reasonable information was available that that could be determined, then there might be a case against the owner / agent to prosecuted / defended against.

Dick Stevenson

Hi Rob,
That was a very interesting analysis.
Thanks, Dick

Roman

Hi John & others. For exactly the same considerations, which you are describing here, we have changed our mind last year, when we were shopping for a boat for our syndicate: initially, we fell in love with Bavaria 42 Match; but even the structural re-inforcement of the keel attachment, which was mandated on this type after a tragic keel-separation event, did not convince us about its safety. Finally, we purchased a Salona 37, because it has the keel attached to a steel structure, which distributes the load into the fiberglass shell.
I very much agree with your suggestion to change the code. But before that happens, I hope that the mere existence of this thread and the investigation reports would inspire the manufacturers to make improvements; or else they will face negligence claims. Compliance with the code alone is not enough for the shipyards to demonstrate that they have acted with due care. If Salona (and I understand that also a few other ship builders) have adopted a re-inforcement/load distribution steel structure, the economics must work somehow – why would not the others do it, too? If the sailing magazines will not write about it (for obvious reasons), websites like this can – and do – spread the message. And eventually, the customers would vote with their feet and this would make the builders change their way. 10 years ago, this would not have worked, because news did not travel as fast. It is different now, with webistes like this one. Who would like to buy a boat, which presents even a non-negligible risk of killing you and your crew due to structural failure? You don’t need to sail across the Atlantic to see this happening. The tragic Bavaria Match event occurred in the Adriatic. On the other hand, I may be wrong about buyers and reputation concerns changing the approach of the ship builders – after all, the Bavaria event is more than 10 years old now and they. And less-than-ideal keel designs are still being manufactured in many places. I wonder how many more sailors must be killed before the codes change. It is always so sad to see regulation where common sense should be doing its job in the first place.